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The great disadvantage of teaching, particularly in the field of the hu-
manities, is that it offers little basis for measuring accomplishment or success.
There is agreement neither about the job to be done nor about the way to do it.
Reputations grow slowly even in soil painstakingly cultivated, seeming to
flourish unduly when nourished from the compost heap of idiosyncrasy.
Recognition and advancement come too often from accomplishments outside
the classroom, from either the substance or sheer bulk of publications, or even
from completely non-academic pursuits. The concept of tenure has been
devised as a seemingly necessary protection against unfairly critical judgment
where there is little or no concrete basis for either charge or defense.
How, then, realizing these irrationalities, is judgment to be cast regarding
the qualities of Wiley Rutledge as a teacher?
There is the temptation to work backward from the fact that he became
a justice of the Supreme Court to the conclusion that he must have been a
great teacher. Love for him creates concern about magnifying his academic
accomplishments solely because of the kn6wledge that they meant more to
him than any others. Yet these dangers are probably much less than that of
minimizing his academic stature because of the inapplicability of the common
forms of measurement. His attributes as a teacher were different from
those of most of his peers.
Rutledge was thirty-two when, in 1924, he came to the law school of the
University of Colorado as Associate Professor of Law. He had taught before,
in the commercial departments of the high schools at Bloomington and Conners-
ville, Indiana, at Albuquerque, New Mexico, and at Boulder. He had taken his
law work at the University while he was teaching in the Boulder High -School.
After he had been at the Colorado law school for only two years, Rutledge
was taken by Chancellor Herbert S. Hadley, who had also been at Boulder, to
Washington University in St. Louis. He became Dean of that law school in
1931, moving then in 1935 to the deanship at the University of Iowa College
of Law. He left teaching in 1939, except for his occasional return as a mem-
ber of a summer school faculty.
Fifteen years broken into four periods, each of which includes inevitable
long months of breaking into new circumstances, offers too little time for the
kind of building which, in the field of legal education, posterity identifies as
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monumental. No treatise or casebook bears the Rutledge name. His contri-
butions to the law reviews were less than those of most of his colleagues.
There are only two "leading articles" and one unusually illuminating book re-
view to bear witness to what his contributions to record scholarship would
have been if he had, as teacher, chosen differently. So it was not as a scholar,
measured by writings, that Wiley Rutledge achieved his academic stature.
As a law school administrator, Dean Rutledge's record was, again, not
distinguished by the kind of achievements which are ordinarily associated with
eminence. He introduced no new teaching methods, conducted few curricular
experiments, was responsible for little pedagogical innovation. A number of
minor changes were made in the course offerings at both the Washington and
Iowa law schools while he was in charge of those programs. Introductory
courses in Legal Method were added to the curriculum, the law review pro-
grams were given special support and assistance, certain courses were shifted
from elective to required status, and the public law programs were expanded.
The record of accomplishment along these lines was probably greater in both
cases than what is normally expected during the first years of a dean's regime.
Yet these accomplishments would have to be exaggerated to make them the
basis for encomiums. They represent in large measure Dean Rutledge's will-
ingness to let individual faculty enthusiasts try out their pet ideas. He not
only permitted, but encouraged, such experimentation. It was characteristic
of him that he was never satisfied with the way his job was being done, and
so he was always ready and eager to see if something else wouldn't work
better. Yet he was no great administrative planner.
What then of his actual teaching, in the specific course, or classroom,
sense? Reporting on a teacher's classroom performance presents some of the
difficulties which characterize the story of the man who died in the middle
of a dream about falling off a bridge.' Students, the only witnesses, are not
very reliable judges of the real quality of what they get in class. Yet there
is, in Rutledge's case, convincing accord that his classes were considered per-
haps not scintillating but uniformly enlightening and stimulating. The dis-
cussion started from the cases, but was no mere rehash of them. He assumed
that they bad been read and spent his time probing, in easy, two-way conversa-
tion, the avenues they opened up. Those who were there refer repeatedly to
his extraordinary thoroughness. These class discussions apparently followed
the pattern of his subsequent judicial opinions. Here was a man of extra-
ordinary conscientiousness who doubted both his premises and his own ade-
quacy. The result was an exhaustive exploration of detail, occasionally repeti-
tive, prompted partly by a desire to be absolutely sure himself, partly by con-
cern about his position being. understood. It was not enough to establish and
prove a point; what was most important was that it be sufficiently developed
that there would be a guide for future practice. He often commented on the
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dilemma of stimulating the law review men while supplying the minimum
essentials to those at the other extreme, the difficulty of broadcasting simul-
taneously on a dozen different frequencies.
Rutledge once wrote of Hadley, who had been his teacher, that "his in-
struction was outstanding for two things, incisive analysis of cases and piercing
through the formulations of legal language to the real social and economic
issues they so often conceal." His own students say much the same thing of
Rutledge. They go on to note the difficulties inherent in trying to satisfy his
dual standard. "Never an hour passed," one writes, "but that the dean would
glance at least two or three times at the clock and then shake his head." It
takes so long, if you stick to the procedure of matching students' questions with
your own, to first comb the historical and conceptual details of a proposition,
and then to consider carefully its social and economic implications. Most
teachers meet the time strictures by deliberately or subconsciously selecting
their emphasis. Few try both to dig deep around the roots of a doctrine and
then to explore the shade or shadow cast by its branches upon the economy or
society in which it grows. Few are suited temperamentally or by interest to
do both. Rutledge was, or at least he forced himself to the double task. It
was an unusual semester when the class in Corporations got past page 200,
and it is part of the folklore at Iowa that when, just before the term ended,
Rutledge was called to the bench, his successor instituted 100-page-a-day as-
signments to insure the students' having what he deemed an adequate expo-
sure to the subject.
It is probably true that Rutledge's attention to the history and evolution
of the concepts with which he dealt reflected more than anything else a sense
of what he considered academic duty. The two papers he contributed to the
law reviews are heavily weighted with historical tracing and conceptual analy-
sis. They are recognized, one of them Particularly, as outstanding papers. But
they lack the spark which characterized the man, and as you read them you
think of some of your friends whose letters make them seem not closer but
farther away. There is confirmation of this impression in a colleague's recol-
lection that "Wiley struggled with the article, until I finally grabbed the first
part for the law review, somewhat over his protest; he never finished the con-
cluding part." Rutledge had few of the historian's impulses, and unquestion-
ably chafed under what he considered part of his obligation. His comment,
made after he had left the teaching profession, about the essays contributed
in 1942 by Pound, Mcllwain, and Nichols to the Rutgers Forum, seemed to
bespeak his real feelings about this aspect of scholarly endeavor, or habit:
One turns from [these essays] with a sense almost of futility in
scholarship. History has its uses. They are not altogether anti-
quarian. Why we are, in some part, as we now are always is in-
teresting, if only for reminiscence. But this [November, 1942] is
no time for easy recollection.
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The time spent on the "social relevancies" represented, on the other hand,
the bent of Rutledge's real personal interests. He talked often, particularly af-
ter the outbreak of the war, about the importance of stressing in education
the present and the future. Thus, to the Chicago Bar Association in 1943:
No campus character is quite so pitiful as the one who becomes
engrossed in seeking the old and the obstruse, so that he loses sight of
the new and the living, the obvious and the simple things. For at the
end of the past are the present and the future, and beyond the most
intricate technique lie the simplest, and therefore, the greatest things.
One of Rutledege's last addresses was entitled, "Looking Forward in Law."
He relied, on another occasion, upon the implications he found in Lowell's line,
And glad Truth's yet mightier man-child leaps beneath the Future's
heart.
There is something almost anomalous in the fact that this man, almost a
reformer by nature, more interested in civil liberties than in authority, more
concerned about the future than the past, nevertheless embraced much of
what would have been considered the orthodox and even conservative peda-
gogy of his period. It is hard to believe that the review of Professor James'
casebook on Business Associations, appearing in the Georgetown Law Journal
in 1938, could have been written by one of the few proponents, in the legal
profession, of the Roosevelt court-packing proposal. What you think of as
typical of Rutledge emerges in his suggested testing of course content in terms
of its value for the average student, in his statement of desire to teach his stu-
dents about the "organization, conduct and winding up of the corner grocery
store," and in his references to the advantages of small, local law schools. But
in the course of that review he aligns himself rather definitely on the "conser-
vative" side of such issues as that of "casebooks versus 'collections of ma-
terials' "and that of "bringing more social science into the law schools." He al-
most goes out of his way to defend "conceptualism" as against "functionalism,"
perhaps proving only the emptiness, or at least the slipperiness, of such terms.
Rutledge had, nevertheless, a well-developed concept of what he con-
sidered the broad purpose of education. His was, in general, the philosophy
of Horace 'ann and John Dewey.
Central to his thinking, and illustrated by his emphasis on the present and
the future, as distinguished from the past, was an insistence upon the integra-
tion of education with the rest of the social experience as men actually live it.
He conceived of the law school as a place where young men are already taking
part in life, not just preparing for it. He took advantage of every opportunity
to weave the classroom discussion into the fabric of contemporary events, not
just to illumine a concept but to make that discussion part of the students'
participation in what was going on around them. As dean, he encouraged a
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variety of programs devised to work the men in the law school into campus,
community, bar, and national affairs. He spoke repeatedly against emphasis
upon educational components lacking in other than academic significance,
against "the accumulation of academic honors for their own sakes," insisting
that "credits, grades, and degrees have only the interest of rusty medals in
museums, if the only achievement in attaining them is the attainment." His
conception of teachers and students alike was a conception of men pursuing
together a function of citizenship.
It was as part of this conception that he himself participated broadly in
the affairs of the community, some related only remotely, if at all, to school
matters. He became a leader in the programs of the St. Louis and Missouri
Bar Associations, was active among the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, became president of the Iowa City Rotary Club, organized evening dis-
cussion groups in both cities, was always running from class to a meeting of
this campus committee or that one, even taught Sunday School for a while.
Irving Brant has described the many ways in which Rutledge was a citizen
first, and -. teacher only as part of his fulfillment of the broader role.
There was kinship with Dewey, too, in Rutledge's attempt to identify and
develop the special significance which education has in a society based on
democratic ideals. He spoke frequently on this subject, perhaps most notably
at the Indiana University Commencement in 1946. He expressed there, as
on two other public occasions, his concern about the fact that it was in the
country where literacy was perhaps the highest that the forces which pre-
cipitated the second World War were mobilized. Taking his text from
Jefferson's concept of "education on a general plan," he took issue with the
proposition that "education in the greatest quantity, at all levels either creates
or protects [democratic] institutions." He excoriated "the blind idolator
who worships at the shrine of education for education's sake alone." The
trouble is, too frequently, that
Our schooling has not taught us as a people to put aside our cherished,
outworn wishes. . . . We cling to policies time and events have
buried. We succumb to vast and sudden swings of emotion. We
delay and debate, until the time for talk has long gone by. We
are swayed by labels, name-calling and wise-cracks, whether or not
the facts contradict them.
Rutledge's answer was that the universities "must be great independent
agencies for full information and enlightenment," not "subservient to men in
political power" or under the "domination of any private, selfish interest or
group or institution." Grouping schools with the press and radio, he noted the
necessity of their giving voice to "special interests of all sorts," the even
greater essentiality of their being
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: . . great instrumentalities of impartial information and dis-
interested opinion and judgment, governed alone by that sincere
regard for truth which requires all available facts before judgment
and renders it with an eye single to the general welfare, not that of
some special interest.
It may well be that these sentiments are so unexceptionable, as the stuff
of commencement speeches, that it would be a mistake to make too much of
them. Perhaps the real-significance of this address was that a good many who
heard it knew that the speaker was not just talking easy generalities. His
discussion of the history and ideals of democracy in society and of freedom
in universities bore closely upon a particular situation that had developed at
the time on the campus where he was standing, an issue which had not then
been resolved. It is often enough that academic freedom has been publicly
memorialized as a fine ideal in the absence of any concrete challenge to it. It
is something else for a Justice of the Supreme Court to state publicly what,
under the circumstances, could only have been interpreted as an enunciation
of the principles applicable to a specific issue, which, although it omitted
a judgment upon the issue itself, most public figures would have considered
it impolitic to utter.
What Rutledge did at Indiana was what he had done time and time again
in his classes. He was a "liberal," by any of the .decent usages of that term.
The precise meaning of liberalism, as he exemplified it, is developed in detail
in the other papers in this symposium. The important thing here is that his
point of view was one that law school students need very much to be exposed
to as they enter a profession where financial reward is likely to flow most
generously from a defense of the status quo. He did more than express that
point of view. He did it in a way that offered potential architects of democ-
racy an example of how, if they so choose, they may, without personal preju-
dice, assume leadership in sponsoring any changes which may from time to
time seem necessary.
In one of his letters, written in 1940, Rutledge referred to some of the
experiences he had in connection with the perhaps classic example of advocacy
of the unpopular point of view, his defending the court-packing bill in Repub-
lican Iowa. He noted that his position had "put [him] on the spot" because
the incident developed "during the second year I was in Iowa City and before
I had time to firmly establish a great number of personal confidences." He
admitted that he had, as a consequence, felt compelled to speak sometimes
guardedly. And then he concluded:
I think it is not a compromise of principle to adapt the expression
of your views to what the group can take without strongly unfavor-
able reaction. This does not mean of course that when an issue arises
where your own integrity requires a frank expression you should not
make it; but there won't be many such situations, other than of your
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own making.. . . And when they arise one can by objective manner
and carefully qualified statement of reasons . . . at least give . . .
some better appreciation of the other point of view.
It was one of Rutledge's great qualities as a teacher that he could develop, in a
way that commanded respect, a point of view covering many areas, which too
often, by the manner of its presentation, only evokes sneers and confirms
reaction.
It seems then a fair summary that Rutledge gave his students a thorough
grounding, a broad basis for understanding, a basis too for healthy doubt, and
an appreciation of the place a rule of law has in a democratic system. This
describes quite a job, measures a substantial accomplishment. Yet to find in
this much alone a basis for special distinction would be less to do Wiley
Rutledge credit than to do injustice to a good many of his colleagues. This
is, so far, only the story of one of a score, or perhaps several scores, of men
who today lead this branch of the legal profession.
There remains to be noted, however, the quality for which Rutledge will,
as a teacher, be longest and best remembered. He was a teacher of law, but
beyond that, and foremost, he was a teacher of men, drawing upon his own
being and humanity for the precepts "students" never get from books. He
was, using the phrase he applied once to his own dean, John D. Fleming,
"both teacher and father to his 'boys.' "
There are today in this country some 1500 men, all who ever studied with
Rutledge, who have in their being a substantial piece of this man. This is the
story of one who, as teacher and as dean, eagerly let students take from him
the time and energy which most of his colleagues reserve for themselves. It
is the story of the pedagogical effect of students' feeling themselves admitted
to intimacy where all they expected was exposition or at most an audience.
What is involved is the basic issue of whether law school students need most
a store of book learning or living examples of how high grade, decent, tolerant
and intelligent men conduct themselves in thought and in action having to do
with the law. If this seems to suggest a false dichotomy, the fact remains
that there is a problem inherent in assembly-line graduate education which
we are today far from solving.
A good many of these 1500 students, those with enough stuff in them
that they test their own reactions before they act, carry their personal juries
around with them. When there are briefs to be written or when questions of
conscience or of intellectual honesty present themselves, there are swift, per-
haps unconscious, pollings of these juries; impulses are tested against what
would be the reactions of these other people-a father, a mother, a wife, a
professor at college, a friend. Part of Wiley Rutledge's immortality lies
in the jury duty which he will continue, for half a century, to do.
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Two instances may be selected from many to illustrate how much more
than the law of Corporations this man taught.
Student morale was low at Washington University as the fall term opened
in 1926. When the new professor imported from Colorado made it plain that
both attendance at class and preparation of the day's lesson were considered
minimum essentials, there was at first a strong reaction. An alarm clock
went off behind the rostrum just after the class had started. It was turned
off. There were violent hiccoughs up in the first row, sudden malaise here
and there requiring precipitate and grotesque exit. It was all ignored. Clark
Clifford has special information about a moaning that came for several days
from someone's unmoving lips. An undertone of shuffling feet frequently
developed behind an epidemic of out-of-season coughing. This went on for
most of a month. There was never the slightest recognition of it on the
part of the newcomer.
Then, on various pretexts, the students began dropping by Rutledge's
office. A question about the next day's assignment frequently branched out
into an hour's conversation. The talk was neither personal nor profound.
Preparation for tomorrow's lecture on ultra vires was set aside while teacher
and student hashed and rehashed the Teapot Dome incident, the Mitchell
Palmer raids, the Child Labor Amendment controversy, and the problems
faced by the St. Louis Bar Association. Here was an unusual combination of
warmth and candour, a blunt, frank statement of position on every issue of
public moment, but an ingenuous charity toward the individuals involved.
The visits often ended with student and teacher going down the street for
coffee. The foot shuffling was a little less next day, and the catarrh improved.
One participant in this series of episodes says today, "I've forgotten the rules
about the rights of minority stock-holders in Missouri, but I have never in 25
years joined another gang-up or gotten sore when someone picked on me."
Then, at Iowa, there was the problem of the intellectual apathy which
always threatens at a law school where a good many of the students come from
traditionally conservative families and expect to return to a casual (but by no
means unsatisfying) small town practice. It was hard, for example, to interest
even the potentially good students in working on the law review. Among the
early callers at the Dean's office were a boy just registered from Sioux City,
another from a little town with a population of three or four hundred One
had a problem of waiving a technical deficiency in his college record. The
other needed some financial assistance. Both recall today their embarrass-
ment upon their realization that they had, before their talks with "the dean"
were over, taken at least an hour of his time. Perhaps it was only coincidence
that two years later one of these boys was Note Editor of the Iowa Law Re-
view, the other, Editor-in-Chief. It has to be assumed that other hours went
to students who subsequently dropped off. Yet it is equally reasonable to
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wonder how much more those two boys put into their law school work be-
cause they had learned that the dean was interested in them as individuals.
These stories could be repeated in 1500 different forms. They would
explain, if explanation is necessary, the paucity of Rutledge law review articles,
the absence of Rutledge texts and treatises, the fact that the Corporation blue-
books never seemed to get graded until just before the next examination
period. (They lampooned the dean in the Iowa Law Day skit one year by
wheeling in an old codger who inquired of the laboring pedagogue, through his
whiskers, if he could find out yet whether "my Pappy passed 'B. 0.' ") It
may even be that these stories explain in part why Rutledge, a crusader and
reformer by instinct, never evidenced more than moderate interest in the cur-
ricular and methodological reforms which a number of deans were instituting
during the late thirties. He may well have felt that the formal aspects of
pedagogy didn't matter enough to make them the subject of strenuous atten-
tion. To one who felt that "the greatness of a university is found in its spirit"
or, again, that "the soul of an institution marks it with distinction or lack of
it," it wouldn't have been a matter of first importance whether the procedural
courses were taught in the first year or the third.
There would, at the same time, be justification for finding in Rutledge's
recognition of the individual personality of each of his students, at least the
seeds of what may someday become the "progressive school" of legal educa-
tion. The phrase is borrowed from its usage in the literature which describes
developments during the past twenty-five years in the primary and elementary
schools. When Rutledge spoke out, as he frequently did, against the "law
school factories" and "mass production teaching methods," his thoughts found
a common denominator with those of Carlton Washburne and the others who
have now made the grade schools in many parts of the country places where
individual children grow as their particular natures justify instead of in molds
which are as likely to stunt growth as to aid it. There are those law teachers
today who cry out against a system of graduate education which runs its
course in the case of an individual student without any faculty member ever
even learning his name. There are a good many who reflect with shame upon
the action of the Association of American Law Schools at its 1948 meeting
when it was decided that one faculty man to 100 students is a satisfactory ratio.
There are even some of these teachers who wonder whether the callousness
that characterizes too much of the legal profession traces to the cold im-
personalness of so many law schools. This goes, perhaps, beyond the Rut-
ledge story. It is the essence of that story, though, that he gave to legal educa-
tion an extraordinary example of what a teacher can accomplish by treating
students not as sponges but as people. The figure is really his own. He
said once of Chancellor Hadley, "Students were not intellectual absorbents
to him. They were also men."
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You wonder what it was that prompted this man to make, from his time
and energies, so much more of a contribution to his students than the rest of
us do. Those who knew him at all know that it was not personal ambition, at.
least in any ordinary sense. Perhaps the answer lies in philosophical or psy-
chological mysteries where exploration is futile. Part of the explanation is
probably offered, though, in one of his last public addresses, given on Decem-
ber 7, 1948, at McCain, North Carolina. The occasion was the dedication of
a new building at the tuberculosis sanitarium where Dr. Paul McCain had
served so long before his death. Justice Rutledge spoke of McCain's relation-
ship with his patients:
Each received his personal attention, and on a personal basis. None
was merely 'a case.' His aid was never given coldly, with mere
efficiency. Without apparent effort, though it cost him much in
time and energy, he created in each person a sense of understanding
and courage.
These were not just the fine words of a dignitary imported for this occa-
sion. Rutledge had come back to "the San," as he called it. He had gone
there first thirty-two years earlier, when he was twenty-two. He said more
about that experience on this later public occasion than some of his most in-
timate friends had ever heard him say before. Most of them knew that he
had once been a very sick man, or boy, but few had realized how he credited
Paul McCain with having saved both his life and his spirit. When he spoke
as he did of McCain, in words which describe so well his own life pattern, that
pattern became much clearer. Perhaps the only mystery remaining is in the
fact that an experience which centers so many peoples' thoughts upon them-
selves led this extraordinary man to emphasize instead the personalities of
those with whom he worked.
There is another part of the probable explanation of this quality of
Rutledge's which can, with propriety, be neither omitted nor more than noted
here. Those who feel that warmth is a pedagogical attribute will agree that
in all except the occasional case such warmth requires nourishment in the
evenings and renewal over the weekends and during the vacations. Perhaps
the heart of the- story of Wiley Rutledge as a teacher is the story of the'
Rutledge family. Here, some day, his biographer will find relief from the
monotonous pattern of the biographies of "great men," a pattern characterized
so much by the apparent necessity of choosing between public success and
family satisfactions.
This then is the record of how one man wrote out in his own tears and
sweat, and probably his blood, what Mr. Justice Holmes meant when he said,
at Harvard's 250th Anniversary ceremonies: "nearly all the education which
men can get from others is moral, not intellectual." Perhaps this isn't so, or
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perhaps it is only partly true. It was, in any event, in this realm of moral
education that Wiley Rutledge accomplished what few others ever have.
* Recognition of the subjective basis upon which this tribute is built has made it
seem some way wrong to use footnotes as flying buttresses. They have therefore been
omitted. It is probably appropriate, however, to list the Rutledge addresses from which
the quotations have been drawn. They include the following: Address at a Meeting of
the St. Louis Bar Association, April 27, 1943; Two Heroes of the Lat, an address before
the Chicago Bar Association, June 29, 1943; Was Thomas Jefferson Wrong?, the Com-
mencement Address at Indiana University, June 16, 1946; Eighty-Six: Forty-Six, an
address before the Michigan Bar Association, September 13, 1946; Looking Forward in
Law, Federal Bar Association Dinner, September 26, 1947; Women's Rights-Barometer
of Democracy, an address at Bryn Mawr College, March 11, 1948; Tribute to Paul
McCain, an address at McCain, North Carolina, December 7, 1948. The "unfinished
article" is Legal Personality-Legislative or Judicial Prerogative, 14 ST. Lot-is L. REV.
343 (1929) ; the other one is Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22
WASH. U. L. Q. 305 (1937), 3 U. PiTr. L. REv. 273 (1937).
I have also relied to a substantial degree upon letters contributed by these men
who knew Wiley Rutledge either as colleague or as teacher: Albert S. Abel, Ralph F.
Fuchs, Mason Ladd, Philip Mechem, Clarence Morris, Edward S. Stimson, Matthew
J. Heartney, Jr., Lowell C. Kindig, Elmer Hilpert and Margaret Warner. Neelless
to say, some of these correspondents would disagree on some of the details which have
been covered.
Finally I should like to express particular gratitude and indebtedness to Edna
Lingreen, who worked with "The Dean" and "The Justice" from 1938 to 1949. and who
has been so helpful in the preparation of this account that only her insistence explains
her not being listed here, as she might have been so many times in the past. as co-author.
